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Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation of Baruch Spinoza in the late 1960s
was of seminal importance in the creation of a political Spinozism.
His reading of Spinoza likewise had a great impact on debates ranging
across (post)structuralism, psychoanalysis, andMarxism. In fact, sub-
sequent currents of thought, with little direct connection to Deleuze’s
1968bookExpressionism inPhilosophy: Spinoza, have discovered elem-
ents there that have proven fruitful for further elaboration.1 Deleuze’s
thought, it should be pointed out, is guided by a relation of strict
fidelity to Spinoza — an author that accompanied the inflections
1 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. by Martin Joughin (New
York: Zone Books, 1992). Interviewed by Pierre-François Moreau and Laurent Bove,
Alexandre Matheron claimed that Deleuze exerted more influence on Spinoza Studies
in France through his Difference and Repetition than through his Expressionism in
Philosophy (seeAlexandreMatheron, ‘À propos de Spinoza’,Multitudes, 1.3 (2000), pp.
169–200). It should be stressed that in Brazil,Marilena Chaui had already analysed the
political topics thatwould becomeof interest to Spinoza’s European readers in themid-
1980s (Antonio Negri, Étienne Balibar, André Tosel, Moreau, Bove, VittorioMorfino,
etc.). See herPolítica emEspinosa (SãoPaulo:Companhia das Letras, 2003), with texts
ranging from 1979 to 1995.
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in Deleuze’s trajectory and in his treatment, alongside Félix Guat-
tari, of numerous contemporary political issues.2 To name a few of
those topics: the relation between economic processes, structures of
social power and the state (all examined from a geo-economic and
geopolitical point of view), interpreted through a political-economy
perspective carefully attuned to the libidinal economy, and vice-versa.
Listing the available works about Spinoza in late 1960s France,
Pierre Macherey pointed to the near complete absence of any com-
mentary about the political dimension of Spinoza’s thought — a terra
incognita.3 Martial Gueroult’s and Deleuze’s 1968 publications were
thus all the more earth-shaking: both were decidedly undiplomatic,
breaking with established certainties and shedding new light on a
thinker that had himself defied established orthodoxies. Deleuze’s
book was part of a series of renewed interpretations of the Sephardic
philosopher that included works by Gueroult, Alexandre Matheron,
and Bernard Rousset.4 But it was through Deleuze’s reading that
Spinoza was transformed into the privileged figure in which philo-
sophy and social dynamics could be reunited.5 His study of Spinoza
was wholly original, involving the development of different philo-
sophical problems, such as ‘image of thought’,6 the ‘surface meaning’,
and the ‘logic of paradoxes’,7 as well as his recovery of the medieval
2 According toDeleuze’s secondary school students, in the 1950s, he often spentmonths
discussing the opening of Spinoza’s Ethics (cf. François Dosse, Gilles Deleuze and
Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives, trans. by Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2010), p. 103). A survey of references to Spinoza in the work of
Deleuze can be found in Éric Alliez (see his ‘Appendix i: Deleuze’s Virtual Philosophy’,
in The Signature of the World, Or, What Is Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy?, trans. by
Eliot Ross Albert and Alberto Toscano (New York: Continuum, 2004), pp. 85–103).
3 Among the works mentioned by Macherey, it’s worth recalling those from the early
twentieth century (Léon Brunschvicg, Victor Delbos, Albert Rivaud, Alain [Émile
Chartier]), the 1940s (André Darbon) and the early 1960s (Sylvain Zac), as well
as Ferdinand Alquié’s courses and the quasi confidential texts of Madeleine Francès
(1937), Marianne Schaub (1978), and the work of Paul Vernière (1954).
4 Martial Gueroult, Spinoza, 2 vols (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1968), i: Dieu (Éthique,
i); Bernard Rousset, La Perspective finale de l’Éthique (Paris: Vrin, 1968); Alexandre
Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza (Paris: Minuit, 1969).
5 PierreMacherey, ‘Spinoza 1968: Guéroult et/ouDeleuze’, in LeMoment philosophique
des années 1960 en France, ed. by Patrice Maniglier (Paris: PUF, 2011), pp. 293–313.
6 See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. by Paul Patton (London: Athlone,
1994).
7 See Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. by Mark Lester and Charles Stivale
(London: Athlone, 1990).
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concern for the ‘univocity of being’ (present in all his three works
of that period). The result of their encounter was that both Spinoza
and Deleuze were refashioned. Their philosophical alliance produced
startling, unexpected mutations within Deleuze’s work.
For Deleuze, the history of philosophy is the determination of the
conditions and implications of a generative problem. That problem,
in turn, is what confers sense on philosophy’s concepts; this is what
Deleuze means when he writes of ‘milieu’ and its double connota-
tion in French: taking things ‘in the middle’ and seeking ‘to grasp the
(conceptual) milieu’. Milieu is then opposed to a doctrinal description
of an exhaustive and static content, following the speculative path of
that which has already been thought.8 It has been said that Deleuze’s
pedagogy consisted in insisting (methodologically and deontologic-
ally) on the role that ‘problems’ play. The problem-question relation
has nothing to dowith ignorance or scepticism, be it learned or vulgar:
what allows one to connect and discriminate among propositions is a
problematic that allows those very propositions to have sense, opening
a horizon of meaning and conceptual production. Without the deter-
mination of the problematic, the enunciative act lacks any immediate
sense, since the argumentation in any case is subordinated to the act of
‘posing a problem’.9 A philosophy is thus the development of a prob-
lem that never depends on a voluntary choice of a philosopher: the
philosopher is affected by an external restraint, a regime of signs that
forces her or his thought—since thinking is not the voluntary exercise
of a faculty. This lends itself to a certain humorous misreading of one
of Deleuze’s most famous phrases: ‘it was on Spinoza that I worked the
most seriously according to the norms of the history of philosophy’.10
Rather than repeating what Spinoza said, it was as if Deleuze preceded
him: he intervened in Spinoza’s thought at the same time that he com-
mented it — all while opening himself up to the thought upon which
he was intervening.11
8 Cf. Manola Antonioli, Deleuze et l’histoire de la philosophie (Paris: Kimé, 1999).
9 François Zourabichvili, Le Vocabulaire de Deleuze (Paris: Ellipses, 2003), p. 66.
10 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara
Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 15.
11 Pierre Macherey, Avec Spinoza. Études sur la doctrine et l’histoire du spinozisme (Paris:
PUF, 1992), p. 237.
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We should regard with suspicion the chronology (or doxa)
that identifies Anti-Oedipus, published in 1972, as a turning point
in Deleuze’s work and as a point of departure from Expressionism in
Philosophy.12 In fact, his writings from the late 1970’s abandoned
the problematics of the Anti-Oedipus. Those later works, which fed
into his and Guattari’s Thousand Plateaus, actually saw the conceptual
influence of Spinoza grow more prominent:13 ‘plane of immanence’,
‘war machine’, ‘nomadism’, ‘apparatus of capture’, ‘assemblage’,
‘minority’, ‘lines’, etc. Several texts from the 1970s, contemporary
with Deleuze’s political engagements, serve to document that
mutation. This turn towards politics was for its part connected with
Deleuze’s startling and dramatic rejection of structuralism in the
late 1960s. It also marked his crowning achievement: to think the
simultaneity of sense and event in the interpretation of Spinoza’s
absolute immanence.14 Deleuze recognized that in phenomenology
and structuralism there was a transcendence of sense, an invariant that
neutralizes production and becoming.15 In opposition to it, Deleuze’s
treatment of Spinoza via the problem of expression led him to address
the question in terms of logic; that is, Deleuze’s approach thus
highlighted the critical force of a philosophy based on the reciprocity
between matter and thought.16
A constant in Deleuze’s texts from the 1960s is his critique of
representation. One way of understanding this stance was the philo-
sopher’s persistent unease with institutions. It was Spinoza, here, who
12 Rafael Becker, ‘Natureza e direito em Deleuze’ (doctoral thesis, Pontifícia Universi-
dade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, PUC-Rio, 2018), p. 188. See also François Zourabi-
chvili, Deleuze, une philosophie de l’événement (Paris: PUF, 1994).
13 Gilles Deleuze,Kafka: Pour une littérature mineure (Paris: Minuit, 1975), Deleuze and
Guattari, Rhizome: Introduction (Paris: Minuit, 1976), and Deleuze, ‘Spinoza and Us’
(1978), in his Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. by Robert Hurley (San Francisco:
City Lights Books, 1988), pp. 122–30. See also Zourabichvili, Deleuze.
14 François Zourabichvili, ‘Deleuze et Spinoza’, in Spinoza au xxe siècle, ed. by Olivier
Bloch (Paris: PUF, 1993), pp. 237–46 (p. 239).
15 In that respect, David Lapoujade wrote: ‘Logical doesn’t mean rational. We could
even say that for Deleuze a movement is all the more logical the more it escapes
rationality. The more irrational, the more aberrant, and yet the more logical’. See his
Aberrant Movements: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, trans. by Joshua David Jordan
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017), p. 27.
16 See Anne Sauvagnarques, Deleuze, l’empirisme transcendental (Paris: PUF, 2009), pp.
150–55.
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allowed Deleuze to examine the issue from the perspective of pro-
duction, relating forms of institutional representation and the passiv-
ity of social formations to institutional norms and conduct.17 This
about-face suggests that Deleuze was no longer seeking to revert Pla-
tonism and its underlying ‘image of thought’, but rather to imbue
philosophy with immanence and ‘to install oneself on this [plane of
immanence]’.18 The concept of ‘plane of immanence’, which appears
for the first time in his Kafka, reappears in his article ‘Spinoza and Us’.
There, Deleuze could be found radicalizing the immanentist proced-
ure by subtracting the markers of power from within philosophy and
thought.19 Deleuze’s Spinozism grew even more political after joining
with Guattari: the concept of ‘expression’ is related to an affirmative
logic; that of ‘power’ to a reconceptualization of both politics and law;
that of ‘common notions’ to a renewed understanding of the composi-
tion of powers (potentiae).20
EXPRESSIONISM IN PHILOSOPHY
Marilena Chaui stresses that Deleuze’s Expressionism in Philosophy
was a revolutionary work for its discovery of expression as a central
concept in Spinoza’s philosophy. The concept of ‘expression’ was vital
for grasping Being as absolutely complex, internally differentiated, its
distinctions revealing the qualitative difference of expressive essences.
From there followed Deleuze’s refutation of an emanative and sub-
jectivist interpretation of attributes, in favour of a logic of expression:
substantial attributes are qualities (intrinsic divisions, by degree of
power) and infinite quantities (extrinsic division in extensive parts),
always univocally the same and differentiated or expressed in inten-
17 Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc introduced the first effort to connect philosophy, politics,
ethics (or critique and clinic) in Deleuze and Guatarri. Cf. his ‘Politique et clinique,
recherche sur la philosophie pratique de Deleuze’ (doctoral thesis, Charles de Gaulle
University – Lille iii, 2006).
18 Deleuze, ‘Spinoza and Us’, p. 122.
19 See Ovídio Abreu, ‘O procedimento da imanência em Deleuze’, Alceu, 5.9 (2004), pp.
87–104.
20 Vincent Jacques, ‘De Différence et répétition à Mille plateaux, métamorphose du
système à l’aune de deux lectures de Spinoza’, in Spinoza-Deleuze: Lectures croisés, ed.
by Pascal Sévérac andAnne Sauvagnargues (Lyon: ENSÉditions, 2016), pp. 29–44 (p.
30)
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sive degrees that do not break their unity — that is, in ‘modes’. It
was here that Deleuze forged a political Spinozism: by thinking the
relation between mind and body according to a logic of isonomy and
isomorphism; by concerning himself with the connections between
things and ideas; and by grasping the central place of the body and the
conatus conceived as intensity and power (or potentia).21
Deleuze approaches the medieval problem of the univocity of
Being in order to inject politics into metaphysics. In this debate, both
logical and ontological, God differs from his effects by the degree of
power in realizing a single and unitary being. Thus, forms, functions,
species, and genres are secondary — there can be more differences
between two individuals of a single species than between individuals
of supposedly difference species. Differences between beings do not
stem from generic forms and specific differences, as if Being were
enunciated differently in various senses, as in the peripatetic adagio.
In the univocal Being — which, according to Deleuze, ‘is said in one
and the same “sense” of everything about which it is said’22 — the
only conceivable difference concerns the degree of power. At issue
then is knowing what assemblages a being can form — each degree
of power corresponds to the power to affect and be affected. Power is
no longer distinguished from action; that is, the power to be affected
is necessarily fulfilled by virtue of the assemblages it can form, where a
certain, determinate degree of power is always necessarily carried out.
The power of the individual thus varies according to their encounters.
Hence the formula: ‘philosophy merges with ontology, but ontology
merges with the univocity of Being’.23 The One will thereafter be
thought of as the differentiator of differences, the internal difference or
immediate (disjunctive) synthesis of the multiple and its transversal,
hierarchy-less communication between beings that merely differ.
InAThousand Plateaus too we read: ‘pluralism=monism’.24 What
is at stake in that formulation is thinking internal difference and the ex-
21 Marilena Chaui, ‘Intensivo e extensivo na Ética de Espinosa: a interpretação dos
modos finitos por Deleuze’, in Deleuze Hoje, ed. by Sandro K. Fornazari (São Paulo:
Fap-Unifesp, 2014), pp. 21–40 (p. 22).
22 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 179.
23 Ibid.
24 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari,AThousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,
trans. by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 20.
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teriority of relations: ‘The univocity of Being does not mean that there
is one and the same Being; on the contrary, beings are multiple and
different, they are always produced by a disjunctive synthesis, and they
themselves are disjointed and divergent, membra disjuncta.’25 Chaui
identifies the effects of this mutation, and its logic, with Deleuze’s
encounter with Guattari:
What could be more Spinozist than conceiving of multiplicit-
ies, without referring to a subject, as haecceities?Or to conceive
of the individual as a component or element of the multiplicit-
ies under the form of singularities whose duration are mobile
or nomads, made and unmade according to their encounters
or relations? Or even to conceive of the mode of realizing
multiplicities not according to the model of the tree’s hier-
archical transcendence, but as the immanent horizontality of
the rhizome, with its plateau-like plane of composition, under-
stood as degrees of intensity?26
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA IS A LOGIC
Deleuze’s interpretation seeks to re-establish Spinoza’s logic of expres-
sion — of speculative affirmation and practical joy — on three levels.
Firstly, as a theory of substance, which explains how the substance is
expressed univocally in infinite forms of being. That is, substance is
conceived in infinite attributes, formally distinct and diverse, but not
opposed nor separate from each other; attributes do not bear a relation
of eminence, analogy, or equivocity with each other. This signals the
end of all privileges in ontology. Secondly, the logic of expression is
a theory of the idea, explaining how thought is adequately expressed
through its own determinations — signalling a via regia towards ma-
terialism, as per Louis Althusser.27 On this reading thought does not
have to be measured against an external reality. This in turn implies a
methodological programme — a theory of common notions. Thirdly,
25 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 179. See also Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 39.
26 Chaui, ‘Intensivo e extensivo’, p. 22; trans. by Nicolas Allen.The commentary refers to
the preface to the 1987 Italian edition of Thousand Plateaus.
27 Louis Althusser, ‘The Only Materialist Tradition, Part i: Spinoza’, in TheNew Spinoza,
ed. by Warren Montag and Ted Stolze (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1997), pp. 3–19.
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the logic of expression would be a theory of finite modes, explaining
how the expression of the substance through its attributes gives way
to the expression of the latter in modes. Expression is real when the
relation between that which is expressed and that which expresses is
modal — when the things themselves are expressive. Furthermore, a
theory of finite modes institutes the conditions for a self-regulation
that communicates the organization of affects.This in turn implies the
question of individuation,28 wherein the notion of ‘problem’ acquires
an ethical-political content and leads to the question of prudence in
experimentation.29
Chapter viii from Expressionism in Philosophy describes how
Spinoza destabilized seventeenth-century rationalism: from within
rather than as a departure from Cartesian thought. The implications
of that subversion, writes Deleuze, is that thought is conceived as in-
dependent from the constitution of a subject — what Spinoza calls
the ‘spiritual automaton’.30 Concerning the intelligence of causes, the
same method leading to the knowledge of Nature also leads to the
knowledge of the forms produced by the mind: ideas have causes and
are themselves causes, in the same manner as things do. Rather than
being the function of a psychological consciousness, or a sovereign
subject of knowledge, ideas arewhat explains the things in thought and
the thoughts we have about them — which are adequate, when we are
the cause, and inadequate when we are only partial causes of them.
True ideas thus need to express their own causes, their own regime
of production. The Spinozist formula ‘verum index sui’31 means that
the criteria for validating a true idea are not extrinsic to it, and do not
require an external sign confirming it. On the contrary, it means that
its criteria are immanent to its own plane of expression. This way of
thinking breaks with the paradigms of ‘analogy’ or ‘eminence’, which
establish between thought and that which is thought an external rela-
tion of agreement or conformity.32 This is one way of understanding
28 Cf. Macherey, ‘Spinoza 1968: Guéroult et/ou Deleuze’.
29 Cf. Jacques, ‘De Différence et répétition à Mille Plateaux’.
30 TdIE 85; CWS [The Collected Works of Spinoza, see abbreviations] i, p. 37.
31 See Ethics ii, 43 Schol. 2; CWS i, p. 479; and Ep. lxxvi [to Albert Burgh]; CWS ii, p.
475.
32 In the seventeenth century, the form of representation of truth in terms of adequacy
establishes such an external relation.
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the Ethics’ ordine geometrico demonstrata: geometry is not a formalism
that assures access to the truth, but rather a form of expression that
allows for the unfolding of discursive figures where the very structure
of the real, in its constitution, is expressed. The logic of expression
is thus a logic of immanence — a logic whose vantage point allows
the thing to be thought as it is. After all, the act in which the thing
is thought is indistinguishable from the act through which the thing
is produced.33 Expression has nothing to do with a designation or a
representation: that which is expressed cannot be dissociated from
the act of expression; expression is not the act of deploying a set of
similar, silent images.34 To speak in terms of a logic means that this
way of thinking corresponds to a formof distributing and relating ideas
according to a ternary (or triadic) schema. This schema interposes,
between the expressed and that which expresses, the act of expressing
or the expression as such; it dynamically posits the conditions of what
they are in themselves, and simultaneously establishes the conditions
of their relation, which is not indicative or representative, as would be
the case in a relation of two terms.35
POWER OR RIGHT
InExpressionism in Philosophy, Deleuze examines rights from the point
of view of power relations as the immanent content of the political
field. He does so based on the description of a historic shift in the
very concept of natural right,36 wherein Spinoza’s concept of potentia
33 See the passage on the idea of the circle in Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the
Intellect (TdIE 33; CWS i, p. 17).
34 The allusion here is to ‘mute pictures on a panel’, with reference to Spinoza’s criticism
of René Descartes (Ethics ii, 49 Schol.; CWS i, p. 486).
35 ‘We everywhere confront the necessity of distinguishing three terms: substance which
expresses itself, the attribute which expresses, and the essence which is expressed. It is
through attributes that essence is distinguished from substance, but through essence
that substance is itself distinguished from attributes: a triad each of whose terms serves
as a middle term relating the two others, in three syllogisms. | Expression is inherent
in substance, insofar as substance is absolutely infinite; in its attributes, insofar as they
constitute an infinity; in essence, insofar as each essence in an attribute is infinite’
(Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, pp. 27–28).
36 This was a recurring problematic in Deleuze’s monographic works up until the late
1960s. See his book on Hume from 1953, which discusses the notion of the contract;
the text Instincts and Institutions from 1955, which offers a programme for the study
82 SPINOZIST MOMENTS IN DELEUZE
is decisive. In his treatment, the idea of a ‘theoretical’ right, as a moral
faculty and voluntary disposition that could either receive recognition
or go unrecognized amounts to a form of mystification— as the effect
of an expected increase of power, or the sadness issued by the lack of
power. Spinoza struggles against the idea of rights as connected to a
prior legal order — be that of institutions, eminent or divine justice,
be it an objective law, authorizing or prohibiting certain actions, or
the idea of subjective rights. Instead, he proposes to understand the
equality of rights as a right itself (or power) that goes beyond a mere
formalism: institutions and collective practices depend on the com-
mon interest, as well as on inter-individual relations; they are not
derived from pre-existing duties, but rather from the constitution, in-
volving the ‘many’, of the right (or power)—hence Spinoza’s formula:
jus sive potentia.
As Étienne Balibar observes,
In theTTP, Spinozahaddefined thenotionof ‘right’ in the form
of a thesis— ‘the right of the individual is co-extensive with its
determinate power’ (TTP, 237). In the TP, he goes on to de-
velop all the consequencesof this definition and, in theprocess,
to demonstrate his originality as a theorist. Taken literally, this
thesis means that the notion of ‘right’ has no priority, for that
priority belongs to thenotionof ‘power’.Onemight say that the
word right (Jus) is used to express the originary reality of power
(potentia) in the language of politics. But by doing so we have
not introduced a separation between right and power, since
the word originary does not imply proceeding from or grounded
in (which is why, in particular, any interpretation of Spinoza’s
definition as a variant on the idea of ‘might is right’ is clearly
mistaken). Spinoza’s purpose here is not to justify the notion
of right, but to form an adequate idea of its determinations,
of the way in which it works. In this sense, his formula can be
glossed as meaning that the individual’s right includes all that he
is effectively able to do and to think in a given set of conditions.37
of sociality; and his course on Jean-Jacques Rousseau from 1959, which intervenes
in the debate on the state of nature by contrasting antiquity’s concept (from Plato to
Cicero) with that of Hobbes — the same strategy he would apply in Expressionism in
Philosophy, in the Vincennes courses on Spinoza, which are contemporary with the
publication of A Thousand Plateaus, and in the courses on Foucault from the mid-
1980s. The source Deleuze cites is Leo Strauss’ Natural Right and History from 1954
— Strauss reappears in Deleuze and Guattari’s 1991 meditation on tyranny in What is
Philosophy? (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
37 Étienne Balibar, Spinoza and Politics (London: Verso, 1998), p. 59.
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Power is an object of admiration, less for its visible effects than for its
invisible operations, its effect-producing properties. This admiration
affects superstition, turning power into something unfathomable —
hence the relation between power and the passions, whereby psychic
lifemanifests itself in the image of an arbitrary and capricious will with
no cause (and as something to be dominated by reason). However, if
particular things are defined by their power, this means that none of
them possess efficacy all on their own.38 Spinoza scholars diverge on
the uses of the terms potentia and potestas in Spinoza—both translated
as ‘power’ in English —, and Latin classics tend to add confusion to
that vocabulary by using potentia to name an absolutely tyrannical
power, whereas potestas refers to a power authorized by law. Spinoza
combines their uses with particular variations, sometimes using the
term potestas to determine the potentia, and yet refusing to found
potentia in potestas. On the contrary, it is potentia that founds power
— to act and to understand, to affect and to be affected.
Beyond the etymological controversy, the problem is metaphys-
ical: for Spinoza, potentia is always actual; it is not potentiality, such as
theAristotelian dunamis (δύναμις), of which potentia is the Latin trans-
lation.Dunamis and energeia (ενέργεια), actuality, are thus fused in the
term potentia. Galilean physics played a decisive role in this operation.
The (physical) phenomenon is the result of a temporal point of view,
the manifestation of a state, of the process leading to that result. That
process, leading to the event properly speaking, and to the relation —
called ‘eternal’ by Spinoza — is the same process through which all
differentiation becomes possible and which corresponds to the neces-
sary correlationbetween variables.What is therefore at stake is to grasp
the differences in themselves, as variations correlating with other vari-
ations. This serves as a corrective to the habit of fixating on an image
of difference.39 Deposing that transcendental principle, it becomes
necessary to recognize the universal dependence of things. Hence, the
concept of conatus, drawn from the vocabulary of seventeenth-century
38 See Ethics iii, Praef.; CWS i, p. 491: ‘Indeed they seem to conceive man in nature as a
dominion within a dominion’.
39 Cf. Françoise Barbaras, ‘Le Concept de puissance dans l’héritage de la science cartési-
enne’, Archives de Philosophie, 64.4 (2001), pp. 721–39; Mogens Lærke, ‘Immanence
et extériorité absolue. Sur la théorie de la causalité et l’ontologie de la puissance de
Spinoza’, Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger, 134.2 (2009), pp. 169–90.
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physics, means the individuated expression of potentia, as the striving
each thing does to persevere without any finality. With the conatus,
Spinoza denies all hierarchy among natural beings.40 By rejecting fi-
nalism, he introduces a ‘near-plebeian democratic egalitarianism in the
ontology’,41 in keeping with the logic of univocity. This is what allows
one to think of right in terms of power: as a degree of physical intensity
that expresses itself in a relation of composition between an actually
existing body (an extensive part) and a mind (which is the idea of that
body). Different from Hobbes, who reduces conatus to a question of
kinetics,42 Spinoza thinks of conatus dynamically as a force and intens-
ity, a continuous clash and conflict, not just among external bodies (as
in Hobbes), but also, and especially, internal to each of them.43
The right of every being is always a part of the power of the whole
of Nature: that which allows one to act on all other parts. For that
reason, the measure of right is that of individuality, which in turn
undergoes variations according to encounters with higher and lower
powers, producing more or less effects. The extension of natural right
is, therefore, defined by the composition of the natural laws of the indi-
vidual with the laws of all Nature. This composition produces greater
or lesser variations in a being’s free power depending on whether that
power is impeded or aided by external causes. All power depends on
the relation that it produces according to the laws of its nature along
with the other laws of Nature that impede or aid that production. This
is a right that is immanent to the circumstances of an existing thing:
‘as much right as power’.44 The reality or unity of the right is nothing
more than the complex of relations into which individuals enter, sum-
marized in Spinoza’s phrase: what can a body do?45 Deleuze very often
repeated this question and he took it up as both a legal and an ethical
model:
40 See Ethics ii, Def. 6; CWS i, p. 447: ‘By reality and perfection I understand the same
thing’.
41 André Tosel, Du matérialisme, de Spinoza (Paris: Kimé, 1994), p. 140; trans by the
editors.
42 That is, of inertia and velocity, hence the continuous conflict of bodies external to one
another in the state of nature.
43 Cf. Chaui, Política em Espinosa, pp. 289–314.
44 See TP ii, 3; CWS ii, p. 507: ‘[…] each natural thing has as much right by nature as it
has power to exist and have effects’.
45 See Ethics iii, 2 Schol.; CWS i, pp. 494–97.
MAURICIO ROCHA 85
All a body can do (its power) is also its ‘natural right.’ If we
manage to pose the problem of rights at the level of bodies, we
thereby transform the whole philosophy of rights in relation
to souls themselves. […] The theory of natural rights implies
a double identification of power with its exercise, and of such
an exercise of power with a right. ‘The rights of an individual
extend to the utmost limits of his power as it has been condi-
tioned.’ This is the very meaning of the word law: the law of
nature is never a rule of duty, but the norm of a power, the
unity of right, power and its exercise. There is in this respect
no difference between wise man and fool, reasonable and de-
mentedmen, strongman and weak.They do of course differ in
the kind of affections that determine their effort to persevere in
existence. But each tries equally to preserve himself, and has as
much right as he has power, given the affections that actually
exercise his capacity to be affected.The fool is himself a part of
Nature, and in no way disturbs its order.46
Powerwill always extend as far as it can—it lacks nothing and is always
actual — and operates between determinate thresholds — varying
by quantity/intensity — since for each existing thing there always
exists another more powerful thing in Nature.47 And because power
is no longer distinguished from action, the power to be affected is
necessarily related to its actual assemblages. Furthermore, a certain,
determinate degree of power is always necessarily performed, making
the power of the individual affected vary more (through joy) or less
(through sadness), according to their encounters.
This concept of power interconnects physics with ethics and polit-
ics. For Spinoza, men only become free when they take control of their
power to act and think, that is, when the conatus is determined by
adequate ideas fromwhich active affects are derived, andwhich in turn
are explained by their own activity and by that which constitutes their
nature. The institution of the political body corresponds precisely to
the moment when the presumed solitude of individuals leads to the
formation of a higher individual. The constitution of life in common
under a form of political power (imperium) takes place in order to con-
cretize the natural right of each one and of all, since collective natural
right is conserved in that form of association.
46 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, pp. 257–58.
47 See Ethics iv, Ax. 1; CWS i, p. 547.
86 SPINOZIST MOMENTS IN DELEUZE
Seventeenth century metaphysics cannot but be political. In a
context where absolute monarchy thrived, the image of a Creator en-
dowed with free will serves as a mirror for sovereignty — and vice
versa. The logical battles taking place in Part i of the Ethics, con-
cerning the doctrines and lexicons inherited from the Middle Ages,
capture the transposition of religious superstitions in the realm of civic
life as a process of mystification. Spinoza’s work thus reverts a long-
standing history of transcendentalism in history. In Deleuze’s review
of Gueroult’s book on Spinoza, he stresses the rigorous interrelation
of power and ‘necessary productivity’. He relates this interrelation to
Spinoza’s rejection of the providential figure of a Creator that acts
by free will, through an understanding that decides between possible
alternatives.48
From there follows the defence of Spinoza’s conception of the
‘materiality of the sign’: the sign is a perceived sign, independent of
the consciousness that perceives it and that remains passive. This ‘en-
counter’ is not of a signifierwith a pre-existing and givenmeaning to be
interpreted. There is no recognition: the sense is physical, ethological,
a variation of power, not the reserve or principle of a pre-existing given
with an establishing meaning, origin or end. To give the sign an ir-
rationalmeaning presupposes the ignorance of divine activity; to think
of it as the vehicle for a different, hidden, eminent, allegorical meaning
would be theoretically mindless and a mystification, but also implies
political submission and a dependency onhermeneutical translators of
the ‘divine message’ expressed through compulsory commandments.
This materialist conception of the sign leads to a semiotics of the
passions of the social body, as developed in the TTP. There, Spinoza
shows how the constitution of the political body depends on a system
of imaginative signswhose function is to stabilize the affectivedynamic
of the multitude. With this, one can read in Spinoza the materialist
philosophemes that are found throughout his philosophy: the rejec-
tion of divine transcendence and finalism; the equality of attributes
and the materialist vindication of the body, as a celebration of its pro-
ductive force that does not break with causal determination and with
48 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Gueroult’s General Method for Spinoza’, in Desert Islands and Other
Texts. 1953–1974, ed. by David Lapoujade, trans. by Michael Taormina (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 146–55 (p. 146).
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the fact of belonging to Nature; the concept of power, the physical
world as natural order with no external principle; the identification of
reality with perfection and of the degree of reality with the degree of
perfection or power. In the last instance, this entails a rejection of any
hierarchy among natural beings according to spirituality and morality
— founded on sin, merit, and punishment.49
COMMON NOTIONS AND THE COMPOSITION OF POWERS
Deleuze considers common notions to be a theoretical driving oper-
ator that favours experimentation, furnishing the condition for that
process in the face of the constitutive conflicts of society (conceived
according the logic of power). These notions reflect the demand to
think the multiplicity of Nature from a rigorously immanent point of
view. This is also its most distinctively materialist feature in Spinoza:
reason not as transcendence, but as that which radicalizes cooperation
and communication.50 But while Spinoza’s Ethics rejects any norm-
ativity founded on transcendence, it does not abolish the normativity
proper to life — to psychic and collective individuation.51
The common notions form a mathematics of the real or the
concrete which rids the geometric method of the fictions and
abstractions that limited its exercise.
The common notions are generalities in the sense that
they are only concerned with the existing modes, without
constituting any part of the latter’s singular essence (ii, 37).
But they are not at all fictitious or abstract; they represent
the composition of real relations between existing modes or
individuals. Whereas geometry only captured relations in ab-
stracto, the common notions enable us to apprehend them as
49 Tosel, Du matérialisme, p. 136.
50 Ibid., p. 147.
51 The last three chapter of Expressionism in Philosophy deal with common notions:
the entire seventeenth century, part of the eighteenth century, and the twentieth
century all presuppose them. The emphasis falls on the distinction between an ‘order
of formation’ and an ‘order of application’, in the character of general, although not
abstract, ideas and in the aspects of the concept of reason that derives therein. This
is accompanied by a set of questions: how do we manage to experience a maximum
of joyful passions? How do we manage to experience active affections? How do we
manage to form adequate ideas? Chapter v of Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (pp. 110–
21), dealing with Spinoza’s unfinished Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, takes
up chapter xviii of Expressionism in Philosophy (pp. 289–301).
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they are, that is, as they are necessarily embodied in living be-
ings, with the variable and concrete terms between which they
are established. In this sense, the common notions are more
biological than mathematical forming a natural geometry that
allows us to comprehend the unity of composition of allNature
and the modes of variations of that unity.52
Deleuze claimed that Spinoza placed empiricism in the service of ra-
tionalism,53 and that the study of the relations of composition among
things would demand a programme of physical-chemical and bio-
logical experimentation, since we have no prior knowledge of those re-
lations of composition. In fact, commonnotions suggest a transition in
Spinoza’s philosophy that would impact the connections between the
imagination, rationality, and affective dynamism. Common notions
suppose a practice (a process of experimentation) and the conditions
of that process, since the process itself does not exist prior to the form-
ation of common notions. Through them, the ‘common’ articulates
the relation under which two modes, at least, come into agreement
and compose a new relation.Consequently, forming a commonnotion
is a function of the joyful passions, as the increase in the power to
act and to think; sadness, born from the encounter with a body that
does not agree with ours, does not lead to the formation of common
notions.The common notion is the first adequate idea, derived from a
long experimentation (hence its complexity, since it is simultaneously
practical and speculative).
For Spinoza, reason is realized by the action of bodies on
other bodies.54 Reason takes root in affections and the common
properties of bodies, starting with imaginative perceptions. This
explains Spinoza’s rejection of the antagonism between imagination
and reason, body and soul, desire and will. Given that human beings
are not born rational but rather experience rationality, reason is, in
the first instance, an effort to select and organize good encounters
that compose with us and inspire in us joyful passions. That is, it
consists in striving to select affections (states of the affected body)
that correspond to affects (variations) that agree with reason. The
52 Deleuze, Spinoza, pp. 56–57.
53 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, p. 149.
54 Gueroult, Spinoza, ii: L’âme (Éthique, ii), p. 341.
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guarantee of the constitution of knowledge and rationality, in its varied
forms, is nothing more than that assemblage and that composition of
bodies and minds.
Common notions are not fictions, they do not substitute a thing
for its image nor do they classify by species, genre, number, or by some
sort of transcendentality. They are ideas in general; they do not lead
us to know a singular essence, but rather are constitutive of relations.
Above all, they represent something in common among bodies (prop-
erties): be they common to all (motion and rest) or certain bodies
(two, at least, mine and that of another). When the corresponding re-
lations of two bodies are composed, they constitute a new relation—a
new form—of a higher power.Thecommonnotion is a representation
of that composition among two or more existing bodies.55 All bodies,
evenwhere they do not agree, have something in common, likemotion
and rest. At a certain point, the common notions make it possible to
understand at what level differences and oppositions are formed. But
since they do not allow us to know the essence of things,56 we can still
fall into abstractions, should we forget their inessential and relational
character.Only the third kind of knowledge has this character of grasp-
ing things in their singularity.
In the entry concerning the common notions in Spinoza: Practical
Philosophy,57 Deleuze seems to mimic the movement that he was pur-
suing throughout the 1970s. Then, he favoured a theory that would
establish aplaneof immanence that is both theoretic-practical andvital
— an epistemology involving a determinate relation between life and
thought. Being that the composition of powers is basedonmultiplicity,
it became possible for Deleuze via Spinoza to formulate the problem
55 Pierre-François Moreau points out this experimental character in the formation of
common notions. See his Spinoza. L’expérience et l’éternité (Paris: PUF, 1994), p.
279. Pascal Sévérac notes the use of the noun convenientia in the ontological sense
in Spinoza’s Ethics (Ethics ii, 29 Schol.; CWS i, p. 476), just as in his Treatise on
the Emendation of the Intellect (TdIE 25; CWS i, p. 15). See his Le Devenir actif chez
Spinoza (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2005), p. 110. Both analyses deal with inadequate
perception, which isolates thatwhich is perceived from thatwithoutwhich it cannot be
understood.On theother hand, adequate perception is born from the contemplationof
various things at the same time, with those things being grasped in their real relations,
according to that which agrees, differs, or is opposed. Cf. chapter xvii of Deleuze’s
Expressionism in Philosophy, pp. 273–89.
56 See Ethics ii, 37, 38, 40 and 44; CWS i, pp. 475–78 and 480–81.
57 See Deleuze, Spinoza, pp. 54–58.
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of sociability and institutional creation as an activity of assessment and
experimentation. In the last instance, Spinoza’s ethics is now placed in
the service of a practical problem, which concerns the understanding
of groups: are they subjects or subjected (assujetis)? This reformula-
tion, in turn, was the clinical and political problem of analysis and
experimentation in the social field, which Deleuze explored alongside
Guattari.58 And it was along that line of inquiry that they sought to
understand the ways in which society is constituted and instituted,
according to the Spinozist perspective suggested by Deleuze. It was
also an invitation to follow the ‘lines of differentiation’59 in which
Spinoza appears to be offering a theory of productive desire (in Anti-
Oedipus) — in the ethological inspiration over and against morality;
in the concept of assemblage determined by the logic of powers, or
in the logic of coessential positivities and coexisting affirmations that
orchestrate the ‘Plateaus’ on the state, politics and law.60 Their project,
in the last instance, involved what one might call a ‘machinic histor-
ical materialism’, and whose properly philosophical thesis defines the
problem of thought not according to the subject/object relation, but
rather by scrutinizing (and tracing the cartography of) the relations
among land and the territories, in consideration of the truemovement
of becoming and the production of the real.61
TRANSLATED BY NICOLAS ALLEN
58 Sibertin-Blanc, ‘Politique et clinique’, p. 48.
59 A formula created byLuizOrlandi, ‘Linhas de ação da diferença’, inGillesDeleuze:Uma
vida filosófica, ed. by Éric Alliez (São Paulo: Editora 34, 2000), pp. 49–63 (p. 58).
60 Deleuze, Spinoza, p. 95.
61 Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc, Politique et état chez Deleuze et Guattari. Essai sur le maté-
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